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A. BACKGROUND
The government has increased mandatory spending significantly. The growth in the overall mandatory spending allocation is the reason spending has risen in past years.
With trillion dollar federal deficits accrued from [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] , and a 680 billion deficit in 2013, discretionary spending has suffered significant cuts (Congressional Budget Office (CBO), 2007) . The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is aware that the military will continue to face cuts and has been looking for ways to revamp military retirement benefits. According to the 2011 Defense Business Board (DBB) report, the current military system is "unsustainable" (Defense Business Board Task Group, 2011, p. 5).
One of the government's focuses has been the OSD proposal, given in the Tenth
Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QMRC).
The Tenth QMRC proposal involves defined benefits, contribution plan, gate pay and separation pay. These are further explained:
 A defined benefit plan provides retirement pay equal to a 2.5 percent multiplier of the High-3. The benefit would be payable at age 57.
 A defined contribution plan under which DOD (Department Of Defense) would annually contribute up to 5 percent of basic pay.
 Gate pay is a continuation payment payable at specified year-of-service milestones. 

B. PURPOSE
The purpose of this thesis is to model variations in present values (PVs) for service members ranks O-5 to O-10 when implementing OSD's proposal and comparing the plan with the current military retiree program. The model variables are YOS and rank, and they will show the impact they have in respect to PV. After assessing the best retirement option, further investigation of incentives for retention and promotion will be explored.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary question that this thesis addresses: Which retirement policy provides more benefit for service members, OSD's proposal or the current retirement policy?
The following secondary questions will be addressed:
 How monetarily significant is the retirement policy for service members with the same rank but different YOS?
 How monetarily significant is the retirement policy for service members with the different rank but the same YOS?
 Are there any monetary incentives for service members to remain commissioned for an extended period?
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
OSD's proposal provided the options for the simulation model, and choices were based on these options. The officer community was chosen because it was the highest paid category, and it allowed for a base case. Life expectancy was based on male officers, since the majority of officers are male. Data for life expectancies were extrapolated from the DOD Office of the Actuary Life Expectancy Rate. This rate was used to calculate the length of annuity payments based on expected year of death.
Results are limited to an aggregated perspective of service members in the male officer community. The assumption is that all changes in this model would have a similar effect on the military as a whole. Assumptions were also made that with the transition to a smaller force being our nation focus; DOD retention issues will average into a normal curve over time.
E. METHODOLOGY
Methodology for this research is to calculate the PV with variation in YOS and rank based on the 2008 OSD military retirement plan proposal. The model assumes that an officer is following the generic career progression. The discount rate was arbitrarily selected based on empirical data ranges of 10 to 15 percent. The rate will remain static.
This adds assurance that the component will not affect possible PV values unless changed.
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE RESEARCH
Chapter II addresses the U.S. military compensation, purpose of the retirement system, history of retirement policies, the current system, and the OSD proposal.
Chapter III gives a model description and discusses methodology and implementation of methods. This chapter will provide a more in-depth description of the PV and the assumptions made to construct the model.
Chapter IV analyzes how the variations within the military retirement policy impacts incentives for service members. This chapter dives into the results of the analytical approach taken to answer primary and secondary questions.
Chapter V makes conclusions and recommendations based on analyses of output from the model. percentile of civilian pay in comparison to age and education level (Hosek, Asch, & Mattock, 2012, p. 34) . The chart in Figure 1 shows the constant rise in pay percentile based on age and education from [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . With the rise in pay percentile, the military pay is no longer below its civilian counterparts but is comparable to the civilian sector. 
II. SIGNIFICANT IMPLEMENTATION AND CURRENT
B. PURPOSE OF MILITARY RETIREMENT
The two main purposes of the military retirement system are to provide adequate military compensation after service and incentives for military members to retire. The compensation focus is to entice, retain, and inspire all service members to continue to strive for professional progression. To maintain proficient armed forces, the government prefers that service members willingly retire. This allows the following personnel to add their values to their perspective services. After an optimal time for service has been served, the following quote shows the importance of retirement:
A sound retirement system is essential to solving the superannuation problem. The services must be kept young, vigorous, and efficient: a sound retirement plan with a proper compulsory retirement age will permit youth and brains to rise to the top in time to be effective…. Other concepts of retirement for those taking up the profession of arms are also important and have been taken into consideration but the Commission does not consider them to be controlling. (Advisory Commission on Service Pay, 1948, p. 40)
C. HISTORY OF RETIREMENT POLICIES
Understanding the history of the military retirement system will help the reader understand why the system was created and how it has changed. It will also help discover the focus of the current program. The birth of military pension can be found as early at 1636 in the war between the Pilgrims of Plymouth Colony and Pequot Indians (Glasson, 1900, p. 12) . The law of the land stated that any soldier maimed during the war would be compensated by the colony for the rest of his life (Glasson, 1900, p. 13) . By 1776, this same concept was written into law shortly after Declaration of Independence: Fifty percent pay would be allotted to all disabled service members (Glasson, 1900, p. 12 ).
There were several legislative acts that have shaped our current system.
Addressing those that created an impetus in changing our current military retirement program is the primary focus. By understanding the impact these acts had, the reader is able to gain insight on challenges for the future as well as recommendations to move forward.

The Current System of Vesting: In 1946, the 20 YOS marks for Navy and Marine Corps officers were established. In 1948, this was established for officers of the Army and Air Force (Christian, 2006, p. 22) .
National Defense Authorization Act of 1981:
This Act terminated the old system where service members received retirement annuity based on final pay. It was replaced by the current High-3 method. This method takes the average of the service member's highest three years of service to calculate retirement annuity. The pay is then multiplied by the multiplier of 2.5 percent accrued for 20+ years of service (Christian, 2006, p. 20) .

Military Retirement Reform Act of 1986: On July 31, 1986, Congress passed the Military Retirement Reform Act (MRRA), commonly referred to as the "REDUX." It used the 5th QRMC's recommendation and adjusted the multiplier from 2.5 to 2.0 percent. The concept is to offer 40 percent of annuity at the 20-year mark, with an increase in the multiplier to 3.5 percent after year 20 and a $30,000 bonus at the 15-year mark. Cost of Living Adjustments were also targeted in this plan (COLA) (Christian, 2006, p. 21) .
D. CURRENT RETIREMENT POLICY
There are two distinct military retirement plans in effect: non-disability and disability retirement pay. They are highly correlated, but the focus of this thesis is to address non-disability pension options. The three non-disability retirement plans that will be discussed are: Final Pay, High-3, and the Military Retirement Reform Act of 1986 (REDUX). Every plan is calculated by a 20-year vesting period and has the same payout formula: (Retired Pay Base * Multiplier percent).
Final Pay Plan
Final Pay Plan is the retirement payment formula for service members who entered the service before September 8, 1980(USD [P&R], n.d.a). This plan is only applicable for service members who have 34+ YOS. Naturally, over time the percentage of applicable members diminishes. Each year of service is worth 2.5 percent towards the multiplier, but the retired base pay is factored on the final year of service pay. Again, with a diminishing group in this category, this thesis will not address this option as a viable threat to any possible changes in the future.
High-3 Plan
All service members entering the service after September 8, 1980, fall under the 
REDUX (Military Retirement Reform Act of 1986)
The REDUX program is applicable to service members who joined after August 
E. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TENTH QUADRENNIAL REVIEW OF MILITARY COMPENSATION POLICY
The goal of providing more flexibility for service members' careers was attempted in the tenth QMRC's new proposal for the current retirement system. The foundation for this proposal is the combination of the defined benefit and defined contribution plans. The next discussion dives deeper the plan's specifics and the components that constitute possible reform for the future.
Defined Benefit Plan
The defined benefit would provide qualified members with retirement pay equal to 2.5 percent of High-3 annual basic pay multiplied by the number of years of service. 
Gate Pay
Gate pays are compensations paid to members who reach specified years-ofservice milestones during their career progressions. Calculations are based off of basic pay, and these payments would be made regardless of whether a member remains in service after reaching the specified year of service necessary to qualify for the pay. Each
Service has different times and amounts allocated for their respective service members (USD[P&R], 2008).
Separation Pay
This pay would equal monthly basic pay multiplied by years of service and a multiplier. This would be provided to qualifying members when they leave the military.
The concept is to ease the transition from the military and, hopefully, provide a buffer for the possibility of unemployment (USD[P&R], 2008).
F. SUMMARY
Maturation of the current retirement system had a metamorphic impact and it is now used as a tool to retain vital personnel, control the size of the force, and to provide fiscal stability for retired personnel. With the economic downfalls that have hit our economy, service members are deciding to stay in longer, which increases the Military Retirement Fund (MRF) liability (Defense Business Board Task Group, 2011, p. 27 ).
This, combined with the increase of life expectancy from early 60s to roughly the early 80s, is another aspect causing cost growth in the DOD retirement liability. The current system was designed in an era when life spans were shorter, second careers were less common, and skills were not as easily transferrable to private sector opportunities.
With growing national debt and increased deficit spending by the federal government, the DOD has received high criticism regarding the current military retirement system. In 2013, defense spending was four percent of GDP and is predicted to head towards a downward trend (Boccia, Fraser, & Goff, 2013 This thesis will explore how variations in YOS and rank effect the retirement compensation of our service members. 
III. MODEL DESCRIPTION
A. MILITARY PAY CHART
In Table 2 
B. HIGH-3 PAYOUT TABLE
The data collected from the DFAS monthly salaries' information were used as a base to construct possible payouts of annuity. In Table 3 , each designated YOS and rank category took the average of the prior two years monthly salaries and the current year monthly salary and then multiplied by 12 to establish a yearly salary. The total was then divided by three to calculate the annual average for the three years. Lastly, the cumulative multiplier was used in the multiplication of the High-3 annual annuity to help calculate the percentage disbursed to service members. For example, in Table 3 the rank of an O-6 at 22 YOS would collect $64,083.36 in annual annuity payments. The cumulative multiplier was based on the traditional 2.5 percent for every year of service. This information was then placed in its respective year to represent the possible payouts at a certain YOS and rank. Information on estimated age of retirement and estimated life expectancy based on DOD actuary statistics was added. This information was used as a base to establish annuity length and age of service member at the time of retirement. It also allowed the determination of payments based on the current policy. Table 3 . High-3 Payout Table   C .
OUTPUT INFORMATION
In respect to the output information, the DOD Office of the Actuary Statistical Report on retiree by rank and YOS were used to make an educated assumption on the possible YOS and rank correlation. 
E. PRESENT VALUE
The model then took the expected years of annuity based on year one and calculated the present value. Present values are all based on a 12 percent discount rate.
Since annuities will begin at age 57 to expected years until death, this was the basis for the number of annuity payments. Inflation and taxes were calculated to allow for more analysis, but they were not included when calculating present values for each rank. Table   6 shows an example of applicable information used to calculate PV.
For aesthetic reasons, Table 7 consolidates the information listed in Table 6 . The divisions are based on a static rank. This allows multiple rank structures and provides the ability to compare different ranks. Table 7 has a YOS section with a pull down option to calculate variations in YOS. It will also allow variations in PV. Table 6 . Present Value Table   Table 7 . Consolidated Output
F. ASSUMPTIONS
Several assumptions made in construction of this model were discussed briefly throughout this chapter. In this section, all assumptions will be consolidated and addressed to enhance clarity. First, the discount rate of 12 percent was chosen based on aggregated findings. There were also assumptions made on the combinations of the most likely YOS and rank based on information given in respect of YOS and retirement. By looking at the highest numbers of retirees in a YOS and rank category, the assumption that a majority of service members reach that specific combination was deduced. Another major assumption was that all service members will live out their lives to their expected years of death (based on DOD's Office of the Actuary Statistical Report on the military retirement system estimates). This allowed for a standardized annuity formulation.
Annuity at age 57 was based on the OSD proposal that service members will receive annuities at the age of 57 after 20 YOS. Table 5 exhibits the possible options for High-3 possible payouts. The assumption was made that YOS and rank for newly retired service members would correlate with the rank of service members at a particular YOS and rank.
Lastly, as mentioned earlier in Chapter I, there was a basic assumption that the officers commissioning age is 23 years old.
IV. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides an analysis and evaluation to ascertain if service members financially benefit or come up short with the implementation of OSD's proposal. There also is an underlying assessment of any significant correlation between retention and the incentives the proposal offers. The results were determined through the analysis of present value possibilities in various simulated occurrences in accordance with OSD's proposal.
B. OSD VERSUS HIGH-3 (CURRENT)
Table 8 exhibits OSD's proposal for an O-5 with 20 YOS. Assuming service members are commissioned at 23 years old, the person is now 43 at age of retirement.
Next is age 57, which is the applicable age for annuity payments. Based on the statistical report on the military retirement system (DOD Office of the Actuary, May 1, 2013), a service member at 43 years old has 27 years of annuity payments before estimated death.
The average range for discount rates was between 10-15 percent (a 12 percent discount rate was used as the base case). Table 8 . Present Value Inputs (OSD) Table 9 shows the annual income during the first year. The income was extrapolated from the High-3 payout chart for annuity payouts based on rank and YOS. A common scenario of a retired O-5 at 20 YOS was analyzed to ascertain if OSD's proposal provides financial gain for service members. Table 10 used the same format for the only difference is that annuities increased. 
C. PROPOSAL COMPARISONS
The High-3 offers higher annuity payments. Thus, it initially looks like a better option compared to OSD's proposal. Again, time-value of money plays a huge role in understanding the best option available. Based on rank and YOS, Table 12 compares the PV of OSD's proposal with the current retirement system. For example, the table takes the rank of an O-5 with 20 YOS and calculates the PV for the OSD's proposal and the current system. Next, it takes the difference of the two, which is $(15,429.53), and adds the assigned separation pay from the OSD proposal for a net gain of $9,391.27. The YOS in the table are based on the DOD Office of the Actuary Statistical Report on retiree by rank and YOS. The concept was that the YOS with the most retirees would be the most common rank at that YOS. Lastly, the table looked at the break-even discount rate that would allow the OSD proposal to equal the current High-3 retirement policy. To equal the High-3 PV of an O-5 at 20 YOS, OSD's proposal needed a discount rate of 11.471%, only requiring a slight variation in the discount rate. The difference in discount rates diminished as YOS increased, until 12% provided the same value in the current High-3 retirement policy as it did under OSD's proposal. progress. This provides service members with a higher overall payout under the OSD proposal relative to the current system, i.e., this gives service members a significant lump sum up front. Separation pay, combined with closing the annuity time gap, allows OSD to provide a more valuable option to retiring service members as rank and YOS increase. also an increase in financial loss between the different YOS. The highest two ranks were limited to applicable time-in-service. As rank increased, the financial disparity was not as large. 
D. SAME RANK WITH DIFFERENT YOS
E. DIFFERENT RANKS WITH SAME YOS
The comparison of different ranks with the same YOS drove the question of whether there is financial incentive to strive to achieve a higher rank. Or should a service member be content at the same pay grade upon retirement? At the 34/35 YOS mark, high-income disparities resulted because of the high amount of base pay service members received. At this stage in the evaluation and analysis, the only applicable ranks were O-7
through O-10. These ranks produced the highest yearly payments in the U.S. military pay structure. Table 14 shows the PV of the OSD retirement plan for the two different ranks, O-7 and O-8 ($1,005,610.42 and $1,148,767.61, respectively) . This resulted in a difference in PV of $(143,157.19) or 14 percent. 
F. INCENTIVES FOR LONGER COMMISSIONS
V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
This study was undertaken to analyze if OSD's proposal would provide more value for service members than the current retirement system. With the increase of government spending and discretionary spending suffering heavy cuts, exploring spending has become an important topic. The single highest element of discretionary spending is the military budget.
To be able to move toward a new future retirement policy, the concept of military compensation was addressed. One cannot change the current retirement policy without understanding how compensation is structured and the components it includes. Beyond the elements of compensation, it is important to have a deeper understanding of what incentive compensation provides to service members. After compensation was addressed, the report described the history of retirement reform. Reviewing major reform initiatives
led to discovering what created the impetus for our current retirement system.
Lastly, understanding the current retirement system is a necessity before looking at changing the policy. Gathering the correct information on what the current system offers and the different options under the current retirement plan allows for a better assessment of the value provided. Three retirement options, final pay, REDUX, and High-3, were examined. Each provided a different type of retirement compensation for service members. Understanding these packages provided a holistic approach when conducting comparisons. An OSD retirement reform proposal was then presented and analysis was provided to compare its proposed value to the current retirement system.
Understanding each component of the OSD proposal allowed for an accurate assessment on whether or not it offered more value than the current retirement system.
B. CONCLUSION
The analysis of the PV of both the current and OSD proposed retirement compensation systems for an O-5 officer, showed that OSD's proposal would offer a more delayed annuity stream than the current High-3 policy, but it would compensate with a one-time lump-sum separation bonus on retirement (at 20 or more YOS). OSD's proposal provided more value for the service member. OSD's proposal provided a net gain in PV of $9,391.27 over the current retirement system. With the separation pay increasing with YOS and the annuity streams becoming more equal, the differential between the proposed OSD and current retirement systems greatly increased with YOS.
The next step was to see whether OSD provided more value for each rank and YOS-not just an O-5 at 20 YOS. Analysis revealed that the OSD proposal dominates the current system at each rank, providing a higher present value to the service member than the current system. The annuity disparities lessen as retirement age gets closer to OSD's annuity age. With separation pay increasing with YOS, each rank was provided a greater monetary value than the previous. Understanding what we are providing service members should help drive how our retirement policies are chosen.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
Studying incentives within the military retirement program is important. A major concern about OSD's proposal is that, with longer time in service, less money is distributed. Separation pay needs to be carefully considered to understand the incentives provided to service members considering retiring. As OSD's proposal is structured, both the separation bonus and the PV of the annuity payments increase with time in service.
The incentives the military offers for YOS should reflect the current preference for the structure of the military.
